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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Kerby Keller, a Pennsylvania prisoner serving a life 
sentence for the first-degree murder of his wife, appeals the 
denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. He ar gues that 
his federal constitutional right to due process was violated 
by the introduction at trial of highly pr ejudicial evidence 
having little probative value and that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did 
not adequately prepare for or respond to testimony by the 
prosecution's psychiatric expert, who stated that Keller 
might have suffered from a condition called "sadistic 
personality disorder." We hold that Keller did not fairly 
present his federal due process claim to the Pennsylvania 
courts and that this claim is now barred by pr ocedural 
default. We reject Keller's inef fective assistance of counsel 
claim because he has not shown that the Pennsylvania 
courts' application of the prejudice pr ong of the Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard for judging 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims was"unreasonable." 




Keller was once a member of a motorcycle gang called the 
Pagans, and his wife, Barbara, was a nude dancer . When 
they married in 1981, Keller purportedly renounced his 
association with the Pagans, Barbara abandoned her career 
as a dancer, and the couple moved to a far m in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania. In 1989, Barbara announced that 
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she was leaving Keller and their son and moving in with her 
parents in Pittsburgh. Keller subsequently learned that 
Barbara did not go to Pittsburgh, and he enlisted a private 
investigator to locate her. 
 
On June 20, 1989, Barbara telephoned Keller and 
revealed that she was living with Gary Reiter , a friend who 
resided down the lane from the Keller far m. Later that day, 
when Barbara returned to the farm, Keller shot and killed 
her. He then telephoned Reiter and asked that he come to 
the farm. When Reiter arrived, Keller ran out of the house 
firing a rifle at Reiter's truck. Bullets hit the truck, but 
Reiter was able to drive away unharmed. Keller returned to 
the house and telephoned friends and family members to 
tell them what he had done. He wrote what appeared to be 
a suicide note, but he did not attempt to kill himself and 
instead surrendered to the police. 
 
The prosecution argued that Keller had pr emeditated his 
wife's murder, and the prosecution attempted to prove that 
Keller's motive might have been his discovery that Barbara 
had been providing information about the Pagans to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The pr osecution theorized 
that Keller lured Barbara to the house and tied her up on 
the second floor but that she broke fr ee and was running 
away from the house when Keller shot and killed her. The 
prosecution introduced evidence of her work for the FBI, as 
well as evidence that during Keller's telephone 
conversations following the shooting, he had connected the 
killing with pressure resulting fr om the FBI investigation. In 
addition, Keller' suicide note stated: "Lots of stress. All the 
harassment. Unfounded investigation by the FBI, Crime 
Commission, etc." The prosecution's theory that Keller 
killed his wife because she was informing on the Pagans 
provided a basis for introducing evidence regarding Keller's 
association with the gang and its activities.1 
 
The defense presented the following, dif ferent version of 
the events. When Barbara arrived at the farm, Keller urged 
her to return to him. Barbara said that she intended to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the District Court noted, however, defense counsel also brought out 
information about the Pagans. See Keller v. Larkins, 89 F. Supp. 2d 593, 
600-01 (E.D. PA. 2000). 
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resume exotic dancing and threw at Keller a stack of photos 
depicting her dancing. The argument became physical, and 
Barbara locked herself in a bedroom upstairs. Keller broke 
down the bedroom door and found that Barbara had 
climbed out the window and was fleeing. Keller grabbed his 
gun and shot and killed his wife. 
 
At trial, Keller's defense was based on insanity or the 
inability to form the intent needed for mur der. The defense 
psychiatric expert, Dr. Abram M. Hostetter , diagnosed 
Keller as suffering from a major depr essive disorder. Dr. 
Hostetter testified that in his opinion Keller satisfied all of 
the nine criteria for such a diagnosis listed in the third 
revised edition of the American Psychiatric Association's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor ders (3d 
ed. rev. 1987) (DSM-III-R), a standar d reference work that 
lists and describes mental disorders. Dr . Hostetter opined 
that Keller's major depression had reached psychotic 
proportions at the time of the killing, that Keller "did not 
fully understand the nature and quality of his acts at that 
moment," and that he had not planned to kill his wife. App. 
405, 407. Other witnesses testified to Keller's increasingly 
distraught behavior over his wife's infidelity. 
 
To rebut Dr. Hostetter, the Commonwealth called its own 
psychiatric expert, Dr. Kurtis Jens. Dr . Jens had not 
examined Keller, but based on information provided to him 
about Keller and his behavior during the time leading up to 
the killing, Dr. Jens expressed the opinion that Keller did 
not suffer from a major depressive order. 3/14/1990 Trial 
Tr. at 933-41. Dr. Jens stated that the symptoms noted by 
Dr. Hostetter were often exhibited for a limited period of 
time by people suffering from "any severe distress," and he 
stated that Dr. Hostetter had not noted any psychotic 
symptoms. App. 433, 438. He expressed the opinion that 
Keller was capable of knowing right from wr ong and 
forming a specific intent to kill. Id . at 443-44. In addition, 
in response to a lengthy hypothetical question posed by the 
Assistant District Attorney, Dr. Jens opined that Keller 
might suffer from either of two personality disorders, 
"antisocial personality disorder" or"sadistic personality 
disorder." Id. at 441. Consistent with this latter possible 
diagnosis, the Commonwealth put on evidence of prior 
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sadistic acts by Keller, including testimony that he had tied 
up and brutally beaten a woman with whom he was having 
an extramarital affair and testimony that he had severely 
beaten a man who had asked Barbara to dance in a bar . 
 
In March 1990, Keller was convicted by a jury in the 
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas of mur der in the 
first degree and attempted murder in thefirst degree. He 
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life and a 
consecutive term of five to ten years in prison. The Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment, and the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Keller's petition for 
allowance of appeal. Keller then filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. SS 9541 et seq. (W est 1998). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial judge denied Keller's petition. The 
Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court declined review. 
 
Keller next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 with the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Keller argued, among other things, that the admission of 
highly prejudicial evidence regarding the Pagans and his 
wife's work as an informant had deprived him of due 
process as guaranteed by the federal Constitution and that 
his counsel was ineffective in dealing with Dr . Jens's 
testimony. 
 
The Magistrate Judge to whom Keller's petition was 
referred recommended that it be denied. She concluded 
that in the state court proceedings Keller had challenged 
the admission of the evidence concerning the Pagans on 
state-law grounds only and that his federal constitutional 
claim regarding that evidence was barr ed by procedural 
default. She also held that the state courts' conclusion that 
Keller's trial counsel was not ineffective under the 
Strickland standard was not vulnerable to attack pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). 
 
The District Court followed the Magistrate Judge's 
recommendation, although it did not agr ee with some of her 
reasoning. Keller v. Larkins, 89 F . Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). The District Court concluded that Keller had fairly 
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presented his due process claim in the state court 
proceeding because he had contended that the admission of 
the evidence in question had deprived him of a "fair trial." 
Id. at 597-98. The District Court held, however , that the 
admission of this evidence did not rise to the level of 
constitutional error. Id. at 599-606. With respect to Keller's 
ineffective assistance claim, the District Court held that 
trial counsel had not provided adequate r epresentation in 
connection with Dr. Jens's testimony but that Keller had 
failed to demonstrate prejudice arising fr om trial counsel's 
performance. Id. at 606-11. Accordingly, the District Court 
denied the habeas petition but granted a certificate of 




The first claim on appeal is that the admission of 
evidence of Keller's association with the Pagans and 
Barbara's role as an FBI informant deprived Keller of due 
process under the federal Constitution. Keller contends that 
the Commonwealth lacked proof of Keller's knowledge that 
his wife was an informant and that, accor dingly, evidence 
regarding his association with the Pagans was not probative 
but was highly prejudicial. As is requir ed in order to show 
that an evidentiary error of this type r ose to the level of a 
due process violation, Keller contends that it was of such 
magnitude as to undermine the fundamental fair ness of the 
entire trial. McCandless v. Vaughn , 172 F.3d 255, 262 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F .2d 44, 51-52 (3d Cir. 
1989). In response to Keller's argument, the Commonwealth 
contends, first, that the Magistrate Judge was correct in 
holding that Keller's due process claim is barr ed by 
procedural default and, second, that the District Court was 
correct in rejecting the claim on the merits. 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth that Keller's federal 
due process claim is barred by procedural default. In the 
absence of an explicit waiver by the state, a federal court is 
permitted under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1)(A) to grant a state 
prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus only if the 
petitioner has exhausted available state-court r emedies. A 
petitioner has not exhausted such remedies if he has the 
right under state law to raise his claim by any available 
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procedure. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c). T o satisfy the exhaustion 
requirement, a federal habeas claim must have been "fairly 
presented" to the state courts. Picar d v. Connor, 404 U.S. 
270, 275 (1971). This means that a petitioner must 
"present a federal claim's factual and legal substance to the 
state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a 
federal claim is being asserted." McCandless , 172 F.3d at 
261. "It is not sufficient that all the facts necessary to 
support the federal claim were before the state courts," 
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982), and"mere 
similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust." Duncan v. 
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). 
 
Here, there is no doubt that Keller challenged the 
admission of the evidence relating to the Pagans and 
Barbara's work as an informant in the state court 
proceedings, but Keller did not give the state courts "fair 
notice" that he was asserting a federal constitutional claim 
rather than a claim that the trial court violated state rules 
of evidence. On direct appeal, Keller's Superior Court brief 
devoted more than eight pages to this issue. See Brief for 
Appellant at 31-40, Commonwealth v. Keller, No. 3992 
Phila. 1992 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 28, 1993). Citing numerous 
state cases based on state law, the brief cogently argued 
that the admission of the evidence in question violated the 
governing Pennsylvania standards r egarding proof of 
uncharged bad acts and that the evidence should have 
been excluded on the ground that its pr ejudicial impact 
outweighed its probative value. Neither the federal 
Constitution nor any judicial decision based on the federal 
Constitution was mentioned. Keller's petition for allowance 
of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was 
similar. See Petition for Allowance of Appeal at 21-28, 
Commonwealth v. Keller, No. 369 M.D. Allocatur 1993 (Pa. 
Nov. 29, 1993). Neither the Superior Court brief nor the 
petition fairly presented a federal constitutional claim. The 
Superior Court, the highest state court to entertain Keller's 
claim on the merits, understood it to be based on state law, 
and this reading was entirely reasonable. 
 
In arguing that he fairly presented a federal 
constitutional claim to the Pennsylvania courts, Keller relies 
entirely on passing references to the concept of a "fair trial" 
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in his state court papers. His brief in the Superior Court 
contained one sentence referring to this concept, as did his 
petition for allowance of appeal. Keller maintains these 
references were enough to give the state courts notice that 
he was raising not just ordinary state-law evidentiary 
issues, but a federal due process claim. 
 
Keller's argument is reminiscent of one r ejected by the 
Supreme Court in Duncan v. Henry, supra. There, the 
habeas petitioner, Henry, challenged the admission of 
evidence in state court on state-law grounds, arguing that 
the evidence was "irrelevant and inflammatory" and 
resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." Id. at 365. The Ninth 
Circuit held that Henry's claim was essentially the same as 
a claim that he had been denied "the fundamental fairness" 
guaranteed by the federal due process guarantee. See 
Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994). The 
Supreme Court, however, held that Henry's argument in 
state court was insufficient to give the state courts fair 
notice that he was asserting a federal constitutional claim. 
The Court wrote: 
 
       If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct 
       alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must 
       surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are 
       asserting claims under the United States Constitution. 
       If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 
       evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the 
       due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
       Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, 
       but in state court. 
 
Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. The Court observed that the state 
court "understandably confined its analysis to the 
application of state law." Id. Concurring in the judgment, 
Justice Souter, joined by two other Justices, wrote that 
Henry's " `miscarriage of justice' claim in state court was 
reasonably understood to raise a state-law issue of 
prejudice, not a federal issue of due pr ocess." Id. at 366-67 
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, the Court 
held that asserting that an evidentiary error produced a 
"miscarriage of justice" was not sufficient to put the state 
courts on notice that Henry was arguing that the error 
violated federal due process requir ements. 
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In the face of Duncan v. Henry, supra , we cannot hold 
that Keller fairly presented a federal due pr ocess claim to 
the state courts. Keller, like Henry, did not invoke the 
federal due process guarantee in the state courts. Henry 
claimed that admission of the evidence produced a 
"miscarriage of justice"; Keller argues that the admission of 
evidence denied him a "fair trial." Since the Supreme Court 
found the former language insufficient to give fair notice of 
a federal due process claim, we are hesitant to attach 
greater significance to the passing r eference to the concept 
of a "fair trial" on which Keller's ar gument rests. Here, as 
in Duncan v. Henry, we believe that the Superior Court 
"understandably confined its analysis to the application of 
state law," Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, and"reasonably 
understood" Keller "to raise a state-law issue" only. Id. at 
367 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
Our decision in McCandless supports this conclusion. In 
that case, the prosecution was permitted to put on evidence 
that its cooperation agreement with its key witness was 
conditioned upon corroboration of the witness's assistance. 
In state court, the habeas petitioner challenged the 
admission of this evidence on state-law grounds, 
"contending that the cooperation agreement testimony was 
`irrelevant' and `prejudicial' and therefore improperly 
admitted." 172 F.3d at 262. We concluded that the 
petitioner had not fairly presented his federal constitutional 
claim to the state courts, and we view Keller's state court 
arguments here as analogous to those that we found 
inadequate in McCandless. 
 
To be sure, we did note at one point in the McCandless 
opinion that the petitioner's state court papers never 
mentioned "the terms `constitution',`due process' or even 
`fair trial.' " Id. (emphasis added). We certainly did not hold, 
however, that a passing reference to the concept of a "fair 
trial" would have been enough to alter our decision, and 
such a conclusion, we think, would have been inconsistent 
with the plain thrust of Duncan v. Henry, supra, on which 
McCandless squarely relied. See id. We thus hold that 
Keller's current federal due process claim was not fairly 
presented to the Pennsylvania courts. 
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If Keller could still present his federal claim to the state 
courts at this late date, we would be compelled to dismiss 
his petition, but it is undisputed that the Pennsylvania 
courts would not entertain that claim. As the Magistrate 
Judge noted, Keller is barred from seeking further relief in 
state court because the statute of limitations forfiling 
another PCRA petition has expired. See Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 9545(b)(1) (West 1998). As a r esult, his federal due 
process claim is now procedurally defaulted. See 
McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260. Federal courts may not 
consider procedurally defaulted claims unless"the prisoner 
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual pr ejudice 
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 
demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] will result 
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To show cause, a 
petitioner must demonstrate some objective factor external 
to the defense that prevented compliance with the state's 
procedural requirements. Id. at 753. To show a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must 
demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crime, 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991), by presenting 
new evidence of innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
316 (1995). Keller does not allege cause or pr ejudice. Nor 
does he allege that lack of review by this court will 
constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
Consequently, Keller's federal due process claim is 
foreclosed from habeas review.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. If we were free to reach the merits of this claim, we would hold, for 
essentially the reasons given by the District Court, that Keller's due 
process rights were not violated. See Keller, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 604-606. 
Under ordinary principles of evidence law, the propriety of admitting this 
evidence is questionable because there was no direct evidence and only 
weak circumstantial evidence that Keller knew that his wife was an 
informant. There was evidence that Keller knew that the FBI was 
conducting an investigation, and there was evidence linking the stress 
resulting from that knowledge with the events on the day of the killing. 
However, neither Keller's wife, nor Reiter , nor the FBI agent who 
testified 
thought that Keller was aware of her work as an informant, and Keller 
apparently never gave any indication that he possessed such knowledge, 
even during his telephone conversations just after the shooting when he 
mentioned the FBI investigation. Nor did he pr ovide any such indication 
 




The second claim on appeal, which Keller properly raised 
in the state courts, is that he was denied the ef fective 
assistance of counsel because his trial attor ney did not 
adequately prepare for and respond to the testimony of the 
prosecution's psychiatric expert, Dr. Kurtis Jens. As noted, 
Dr. Jens stated, among other things, that Keller may have 
had "sadistic personality disorder," and the Commonwealth 
put on evidence of Keller's prior sadistic acts. 
 
Defense counsel did not attempt to discover the nature of 
Dr. Jens's testimony before trial and did not seek to bar the 
admission of Dr. Jens's testimony about "sadistic 
personality disorder."3  However, defense counsel did 
conduct a lengthy and skillful cross-examination regarding 
the other aspects of Dr. Jens's testimony. App. 444-73. In 
particular, counsel focused on the fact that Dr. Jens had 
made his diagnosis without ever speaking with Keller , and 
defense counsel elicited Dr. Jens's agr eement that Keller 
appeared to possess all of the symptoms of major 
depression as set forth in the DSM-III-R. Id. at 445-47, 449- 
52, 457-58. Dr. Jens stated, however, that in order to make 
a diagnosis of major depression, a psychiatrist would have 
to make a professional assessment as to whether the 
subject possessed each of those symptoms to the r equisite 
degree. Id. at 451-52. Defense counsel did not dwell on the 
subject of "sadistic personality disorder ," but he did elicit 
Dr. Jens's agreement that a patient could have both a 
major depressive disorder (Dr. Hostetter's diagnosis) and 
"sadistic personality disorder." Id. at 467-68. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in his supposed suicide note. A federal habeas court, however, cannot 
decide whether the evidence in question was pr operly allowed under the 
state law of evidence. A federal habeas court is limited to deciding 
whether the admission of the evidence rose to the level of a due process 
violation, and, like the District Court, we do not believe that it did 
here. 
 
3. The DSM-III-R states that "[t]he essential feature of this disorder is 
a 
pervasive pattern of cruel, demeaning, and aggressive behavior directed 
toward other people, beginning by early adulthood. The sadistic behavior 
is often evident both in social relationships (particularly with family 
members) and at work (with subordinates). . . ." DSM-III-R at 369. 
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In his PCRA petition, Keller maintained that his trial 
counsel was ineffective because he did not challenge the 
validity of the concept of "sadistic personality disorder," 
which, he argued, was not scientifically r eliable and was 
not generally accepted in the field of psychiatry. At a 
hearing before the judge who had tried the case, Keller 
presented the testimony of an expert, Susan Feister, M.D., 
a clinical psychiatrist, who pointed out that "sadistic 
personality disorder" was not included in the main body of 
the DSM-III-R, the most recent version of the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual at the time of Keller's trial, but instead 
appeared in an appendix for proposed diagnostic categories 
needing further study. See DSM-III-R at xxv-xxvi, 369-70. 
Dr. Feister testified that "[sadistic personality disorder] was 
not an accepted official diagnosis" at that time. She added 
that "sadistic personality disorder" was not included in the 
more recent DSM-IV and that she thought that it was 
unlikely ever to be included as an official diagnosis. 
 
The trial judge rejected Keller's ineffective assistance 
claim. The judge noted that although "sadistic personality 
disorder" was not included in the main body of the DSM-III- 
R, it was included in the appendix and had thus"been 
accepted as a classification, albeit one under going 
scrutiny." Commonwealth v. Keller, No. 1731-1989, slip op. 
at 8 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. Oct. 21, 1996), r eprinted in App. at 
63. The judge added: 
 
       We take judicial notice of the fact that defendant's own 
       psychiatric expert, Susan Feister, M.D., who criticized 
       Dr. Jens's use of the [sadistic personality disorder] 
       diagnosis, concluded as follows in a book chapter 
       dated the same year as the trial: 
 
       Thus, data available to date, while not extensive, 
       suggest that sadistic personality disorder , as 
       described in the DSM-III-R describes a personality 
       pattern with remarkably high inter nal consistency 
       and descriptive validity. 
 
Id. (quoting M. Gay & S. Feister, Sadistic Personality 
Disorder, in Psychiatry (R. Michels ed., 1990)). The judge 
also observed that "Dr. Feister would have relied on this 
textbook to make a diagnosis" and that Keller had not been 
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"prejudiced by use of an improper diagnostic term." Id. at 
8-9, reprinted in App. at 63-64. 
 
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial judge's 
holding. The Superior Court wrote that the PCRA court had 
found that "sadistic personality disorder was generally 
accepted as a psychiatric diagnosis at the time of trial" and 
sustained that finding. Commonwealth v. Keller , No. 4137 
Phila. 1996, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 19, 1997), 
reprinted in App. at 84. Thus, both the trial judge and the 
Superior Court have held that the Strickland standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims has not been met. 
 
Our review of the state courts' decisions is delineated in 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). As amended by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.S 2254(d) 
precludes federal habeas corpus relief unless the state 
courts' adjudication 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States; or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
       evidence presented in the State court pr oceeding. 
 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), a majority of 
the Justices accepted the following interpretation of 
subsection (1): 
 
       [T]he writ may issue only if one of the following two 
       conditions is satisfied--the state-court adjudication 
       resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . 
       clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
       Supreme Court of the United States," or (2)"involved 
       an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established 
       Federal law, as determined by the Supr eme Court of 
       the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a 
       federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 
       court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that r eached 
       by this Court on a question of law or if the state court 
       decides a case differently than this Court has on a set 
       of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the 
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       "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas 
       court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the 
       correct governing legal principle fr om this Court's 
       decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to 
       the facts of the prisoner's case. 
 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A federal habeas court may 
not grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause 
unless a state court's application of clearly established 
federal law was objectively unreasonable; an incorrect 
application of federal law alone does not warrant r elief. Id. 
at 411. 
 
Our court's prior interpretation of 28 U.S.C.S 2254(d) in 
Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F .3d 877, 891 (3d 
Cir. 1999)(en banc), is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 
197 (3d Cir. 2000). As we put it in Matteo, the federal 
habeas court must identify the applicable Supr eme Court 
precedent and then 
 
       must determine whether the state court decision was 
       "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent that governs 
       the petitioner's claim. Relief is appropriate only if the 
       petitioner shows that Supreme Court precedent 
       requires an outcome contrary to that r eached by the 
       relevant state court. In the absence of such a showing, 
       the federal habeas court must ask whether the state 
       court decision represents an "unr easonable application 
       of " Supreme Court precedent: that is, whether the 
       state court decision, evaluated objectively and on the 
       merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot r easonably 
       be justified. If so, then the petition should be granted. 
 
Matteo, 171 F.3d at 891 (inter nal quotations omitted). 
 
Here, the "clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1), is the standard for inef fective assistance of 
counsel enunciated in Strickland. See W illiams, 529 U.S. at 
391. Under Strickland, a defendant seeking to establish a 
Sixth Amendment violation must show that counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, as evaluated in light of the facts of the case 
at the time of counsel's conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
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688-89. A defendant also must show that counsel's 
deficient performance actually pr ejudiced his defense. Id. at 
687. A defendant is prejudiced if "ther e is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unpr ofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The 
reviewing court must consider the effect of any errors in 
light of the totality of the evidence. Id. at 695-96. A 
defendant must demonstrate both deficient per formance 
and resulting prejudice in order to state an ineffective 
assistance claim. Id. at 697. Because Strickland does not 
unequivocally mandate a particular outcome in this case, 
we proceed under the "unreasonable application" prong of 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). 
 
We need not address the first pr ong of the Strickland test 
under S 2254(d) because we agree with the District Court 
that the state courts' rejection of Keller's claim did not 
involve an unreasonable application of the second prong of 
that test under S 2254(d)(1). 
 
Keller argues that his trial attorney should have 
attempted to prevent the admission of Dr . Jens's testimony 
about "sadistic personality disorder" on the ground that it 
was scientifically unreliable and not generally accepted in 
the field of psychiatry. Keller contends that this testimony 
failed to meet the standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for the 
admission of expert testimony at a federal trial. This case, 
however, is not a direct appeal fr om a federal trial in which 
counsel objected to the admission of expert testimony 
under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Keller was tried in state court, and 
the admission of expert testimony in a state trial presents 
a question of state law4 -- unless, of course, the evidence 
violates due process or some other federal constitutional 
right, and Keller makes no such argument. In this case, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not decided whether to adopt 
the Daubert test or retain the "Frye" test, see Frye v. United States,293 
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which it endorsed in Commonwealth v. Topa, 
369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977). See Blum v. Merr ell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). 
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both the PCRA judge, who presided over Keller's trial, and 
the Superior Court held that Dr. Jens's testimony was 
proper, and we must therefor e proceed on the assumption 
that this testimony would have been admitted at trial even 
if defense counsel had objected. Consequently, it is 
apparent that Keller was not prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to object. 
 
Keller also contends that trial counsel was inef fective 
because he was not prepared to cross-examine Dr. Jens 
about "sadistic personality disorder" and did not do so 
adequately. As noted, however, under S 2254(d) we must 
decide whether a determination of no pr ejudice involves an 
unreasonable application of Strickland. A full presentation 
relating to the status of "sadistic personality disorder" at 
the time of Keller's trial would have brought the following 
facts to the jury's attention. The "Work Group" appointed to 
revise the DSM-III had recommended that "sadistic 
personality disorder" and two other categories be included 
in the main body of the DSM-III-R, but these 
recommendations met with "strenuous objections." DSM-III- 
R at xxv. "The advisory committees that had worked on the 
definitions of these disorders and the W ork Group believed 
that there was sufficient resear ch and clinical evidence 
regarding the validity of each of these categories to justify 
its inclusion in the revised manual," but"critics of each of 
these categories believed that not only was adequate 
evidence of the validity of these categories lacking" but that 
they "had a high potential for misuse." Id . at xxv-xxvi. "This 
controversy was resolved by the inclusion of these three 
categories in [an appendix] to facilitate further systematic 
clinical study and research." Id . at xxvi. Thus, a full 
presentation would have informed the jury that mental 
health researchers and clinicians disagr eed about the 
validity of "sadistic personality disorder" as a diagnostic 
category. Bringing out this disagreement might have 
diminished the force of Dr. Jens's testimony regarding 
"sadistic personality disorder" to some degree, but it would 
not by any means have entirely discredited it. See Keller, 89 
F. Supp. 2d at 611 ("full cross-examination on the subject 
would only have revealed that the diagnosis was of a 
proposed psychiatric category, not that it was an 
inadmissible or improper consideration"). Moreover, 
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weakening the effect of Dr. Jens's testimony on this point 
would have had little logical bearing on the mor e critical 
parts of his testimony, namely, his conclusion that Keller 
did not suffer from a major depressive disorder, did not 
experience a psychotic episode at the time of the killing, 
and was able to understand right and wrong and to form a 
specific intent to kill. Dr. Jens's testimony on these points, 
which were central to Keller's defenses of insanity and 
diminished capacity, were not at all dependent on Dr. 
Jens's conclusion that Keller may have suffer ed from 
"sadistic personality disorder." See id. In light of all this, it 
is not unreasonable to conclude that Keller  was not 
prejudiced in the sense relevant her e, i.e., that there is not 
a reasonable probability that the jury, if aware of the 
disagreement among mental health experts about"sadistic 
personality disorder," would have found either that Keller 
was insane or incapable of forming the intent required for 
first-degree murder. Keller's ineffective assistance of 




For the reasons explained above, we affir m. 
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